Introduction
In 1999, Chile announced the adoption of a fully fledged inflation targeting regime. Accordingly, a floating regime for the Chilean peso was also adopted. Nevertheless, the Central Bank of Chile also announced that exchange rate interventions would occur if exceptional circumstances justified them. The natural question to ask is: are exceptional interventions in conflict with an inflation target? Are inflation expectations in danger of becoming unanchored when such interventions occur? In this paper, we address these questions by analyzing whether the amount of interventions Granger-cause some measure of inflation expectations.
We consider two episodes of preannounced central bank interventions during the sample period 2007-2012. Our results using survey-based inflation expectations indicate that the intervention program carried out in 2008 had a significant, but relatively short-lived, impact on the distribution of inflation expectations at long horizons. In sharp contrast, the intervention carried out in 2011 shows no relevant impact on the distribution of inflation expectations in Chile. A daily analysis using break-even inflation rate as a proxy for inflation expectations is roughly consistent with these results. Our analysis also suggests that the interventions did have an impact on daily exchange returns, especially in the following days after the programs were announced.
In the last few decades, an important number of emerging economies have adopted inflation targeting regimes (ITR) for conducting their monetary policy. According to Mishkin (2000) , several conditions are required for the adoption of such schemes. In particular, a purely floating exchange rate regime is needed. This is a critical, or at the very least, controversial condition for emerging economies, which have a long tradition of using explicit or implicit exchange rate targets aimed at either achieving low and stable inflation or at improving the competitiveness of their economy. In this regard, in many cases the transition toward a fully fledged inflation targeting regime has been a little impure at times, given that exchange rate interventions have occurred with some frequency.
If we take seriously the well known "impossible trinity", small open economies implementing a fully fledged inflation targeting regime should refrain from attempts to explicitly intervene in the foreign exchange market. 1 In this context, interventions should in theory be useless and furthermore they have the potential to interfere with the inflation target and to compromise the key role that inflation expectations play in this monetary system.
Beyond any theoretical argument, in practice small open economies implementing inflation targeting regimes do occasionally intervene in the exchange rate market. The effectiveness of these sterilised interventions is the subject of debate and the empirical evidence is mixed: see, for instance, Sarno and Taylor (2001) , Kamil (2008) , Broto (2013) , Adler and Tovar (2011) , Dominguez (2006) , Fatum and Hutchison (2003) and Contreras, Pistelli and Sáez (2013) for some examples of articles investigating the effectiveness of interventions. Another interesting topic associated with forex interventions is that they may potentially conflict with the conduct of monetary policy. This is important because, irrespective of their effectiveness, interventions could have side effects on other variables of the economy and, as mentioned by Gersl and Holub (2006) and Gnabo, Mello and Moccero (2010), they might run the risk of being perceived as inconsistent with monetary policy. 2 In particular, they could have the collateral effect of an impact on the distribution of inflation expectations. This is so mainly for two reasons. First, if as a consequence of an intervention there is a shift in the level of the exchange rate, imported inflation will be affected and inflation expectations should reflect this impact. Second, if the intervention is perceived as a policy reaction that is in conflict with the inflationary target, then the monetary authority might lose credibility and inflation expectations might become more reluctant to respond to the central bank's actions. 3 It is important to say that, even if interventions are sterilized, these two channels may be present.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a short literature review and a description of the Central Bank of Chile's history of interventions. In Section 3 we present our empirical approach and our results. Section 4 concludes.
Brief literature review and interventions in Chile
Most of the empirical literature analyzing exchange rate interventions focuses on the impact that these interventions may have on the exchange rate, its volatility or some measures of liquidity (see, for instance, Sarno and Taylor (2001) , Tapia and Tokman (2003) and Berganza and Broto (2012) ). Irrespective of the effectiveness of the intervention in achieving the preannounced goal, the intervention itself may induce some collateral effects on other variables in the economy. For instance, interventions may affect order flow, risk premiums and expectations. Interestingly, even if the intervention fails to create a desired impact on a given variable, it may generate an undesired side effect on another variable. This is extremely relevant in inflation targeting countries because an exchange rate intervention "...runs the risk of transforming the exchange rate into a nominal anchor for monetary policy that takes precedence over the inflation target, at least in the eyes of the public" (Mishkin (2000) ). An interesting analysis of interventions in an inflation targeting economy is found in Kamil (2008) . He points out that policymakers in many emerging inflation targeting economies are attempting to resist currency appreciation while simultaneously trying to meet their inflation targets. Analyzing the case of Colombia, Kamil (2008) finds that exchange rate interventions were effective during the period 2004-2006, when foreign currency purchases were undertaken during a period of monetary easing. In 2007, however, he found that interventions were ineffective in slowing down the appreciation of the domestic currency, as large-scale interventions became incompatible with meeting the inflation target in an overheating economy. In a related article, Ades et al (2002) focus on the possibility that interventions may be considered excessive by the public. The point here is that, if interventions are not clearly justified, they could threaten the inflation target as people may construct the belief that the implicit target of the central bank is different from the one explicitly announced.
In the particular case of Chile, Ades et al (2002) find that interventions have not been excessive, as they were aimed at preventing deviations of the exchange rate from its long-run equilibrium value, while in other countries, central banks seem to have intervened against any fluctuation of the exchange rate. Following a similar line of thought, we will explore whether the amount of preannounced central bank interventions Granger-cause the distribution of inflation expectations at long horizons and therefore undermine the inflationary target. Before moving to the empirical analysis, in the next subsection we provide a brief description of the exchange rate interventions carried out by the Central Bank of Chile since 2000.
Interventions in Chile
The inflation targeting regime in Chile was adopted in 1990 in a gradual way because, as Schmidt-Hebbel and Werner (2002) point out, the central bank also pursued an exchange rate target between 1984 and 1999, although the inflation target was dominant in Chile's dual nominal anchor system.
In 1999 this scheme was tightened up, when Chile adopted a floating regime for the exchange rate. In this new scenario, the central bank reserved the right to intervene in the foreign exchange market in exceptional circumstances such as excessive depreciations or appreciations of the local currency that could have potentially negative effects for the economy. 4 Since 2000, the Central Bank of Chile has carried out four intervention programs in the exchange rate market. The first two interventions took place in 2001 and 2002 and shared several common features. First, these two interventions were preannounced by a public press release. Second, they were justified on the grounds of a perceived market overreaction to worsening international conditions. Third, they were implemented in the context of an important depreciation of the domestic currency against the American dollar. Fourth, both interventions were characterized by a mixture of two measures: An increase in the supply of Indexed Bonds in Dollars by an amount that could not exceed US$2,000 million and the announcement that a total amount of US$2,000 million in reserves could potentially be used in direct sales to the market in the upcoming four months. No specific schedule was established for either of these two operations. Interestingly, the actual amount of direct sales of dollars during the 2002 intervention was exactly zero 5 .
The interventions of 2008 and 2011 were performed in a very different way. Even though they were also announced in advance, they were justified on the grounds of the benefit that an accumulation of international reserves could bring to the country in the circumstances of international financial turmoil. These two interventions were carried out in a context of an appreciating domestic currency and were implemented via direct purchases of dollars only. In particular, in April 2008, the central bank argued that an increase in the level of international reserves would be useful in order to counter deteriorating international conditions. On that occasion, the exact mechanism adopted was to increase the level of international reserves by the amount of US$8,000 million through daily dollar purchases of US$50 million that would span the period from Monday, April 14 to December 12, 2008 . Similarly, in January 2011, the central bank announced another program of accumulation of reserves with the same basic objective of being better prepared to face the event of a significant deterioration in the external environment. The basic plan was to acquire a total of US$12,000 million during the year 2011 by daily dollar purchases of US$50 million from January 5 to December 16 2011. While the last intervention in 2011 was carried out as planned, the intervention in 2008 was abruptly stopped on September 29 2008, when only 71.88% of the preannounced accumulation of reserves was actually acquired. 6 After this announcement, no further purchases of dollars were carried out. The central bank argued that this decision was made in order to mitigate the consequences that the global financial turmoil might have had on the Chilean economy. In the next section, we will show some empirical results aimed at determining a predictive relationship between exchange rate interventions and the distribution of inflation expectations.
The empirical approach
We engage in three different exercises to analyze the relationship between exchange rate interventions in Chile and different measures of inflation expectations. The first two exercises make use of monthly data for Chilean CPI, the monthly amount of dollar purchases carried out by the Central Bank of Chile, a set of covariates and nine deciles of inflation expectations at 1, 12 and 24 months ahead. These deciles are obtained from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) carried out by the Central Bank of Chile on a monthly basis.
The third exercise is carried out using daily data for the break-even inflation rate as a proxy for inflation expectations. This exercise is carried out mainly to analyze the role that the announcements may have in affecting expectations. On a monthly basis, it is hard to detect any impact from the announcements, but we expect better results at a higher frequency. In the next subsections we describe the methodology and results of our exercises. 
Seemingly unrelated approach
We are interested in the following joint system of equations: These equations are estimated in differences because the inflation expectation deciles may be extremely persistent. This may pose a problem in a regression with a small number of observations. Figure 2 below shows the median of inflation expectations at 1, 12 and 24 months ahead. This figure shows that inflation expectations at longer horizons are quite persistent. This feature is also shared by other deciles of inflation expectations two years ahead, as shown in Figure 3 . Figure 4 shows that when taking first differences, the reduction in the persistence of inflation expectations is important, at least for expectations 1 and 12 months ahead.
It is also worth noticing that the disagreement between the different respondents of the SPF is also important as shown in Figure 5 . In this picture we plot the difference between the ninth and first decile of inflation expectations. The gap shown in this picture is, at times, substantial.
We estimate the system of nine equations in (1) using a seemingly unrelated approach. Therefore the possible high correlation between the different expectations deciles is explicitly taken into consideration to get more precise estimates of the parameters.
Given the reduced number of observations in our analysis, we consider a relatively low number of covariates. Basically we select those variables that, in our opinion, are the most relevant to describe the evolution of inflation expectations. We use: Chilean year-on-year CPI inflation, monthly average of the Federal Reserve Funds rate, monthly average of the Dow Jones index, monthly World Bank Commodities Index (WBCI) and the projection of the nominal Chilean exchange rate on the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) and the WBCI. To construct this last variable we simply estimate the following regression by OLS:
as the last covariate in (1).
It is also important to point out that inflation expectations are also expressed in terms of year-on-year variation, so that both inflation expectations and inflation are expressed in the same units. Tables 1-3 below show the results of the estimation of (1). In these tables we report the γ coefficient associated to the intervention variable. We also report its t-statistic, its p-value (called "Prob" in the tables) and the 2 R of the corresponding equation. Table 1 shows that the amount of interventions do not Granger-cause inflation expectations one month ahead. In fact, not a single decile seems to be determined by the amount of the intervention. 2001M05  2001M08  2001M11  2002M02  2002M05  2002M08  2002M11  2003M02  2003M05  2003M08  2003M11  2004M02  2004M05  2004M08  2004M11  2005M02  2005M05  2005M08  2005M11  2006M02  2006M05  2006M08  2006M11  2007M02  2007M05  2007M08  2007M11  2008M02  2008M05  2008M08  2008M11  2009M02  2009M05  2009M08  2009M11  2010M02  2010M05  2010M08  2010M11  2011M02  2011M05  2011M08 2001M10  2002M01  2002M04  2002M07  2002M10  2003M01  2003M04  2003M07  2003M10  2004M01  2004M04  2004M07  2004M10  2005M01  2005M04  2005M07  2005M10  2006M01  2006M04  2006M07  2006M10  2007M01  2007M04  2007M07  2007M10  2008M01  2008M04  2008M07  2008M10  2009M01  2009M04  2009M07  2009M10  2010M01  2010M04  2010M07  2010M10  2011M01  2011M04  2011M07  2011M10  2012M1 Table 2 below shows a quite different view for inflation expectations 12 months ahead as eight out of the nine deciles are statistically not indifferent to the amount of interventions at the 10% level. In terms of the economic interpretation, we see coefficients that are far from negligible. For instance, for the median of inflation expectations one year ahead, we obtain a coefficient of 0.313, indicating that an increment of $1 billion in purchases predicts a rise of 31.3 basis points in inflation expectations one year ahead. It is interesting to remark that the impact is the highest in the case to the ninth decile. In this case an increment of $1 billion in purchases predicts a rise of 39.4 basis points in inflation expectations one year ahead. Table 3 below indicates that the amount of the interventions seems to have an impact on only two or three deciles of the distribution of inflation expectations two years ahead. In particular, the impact on the median of the distribution is statistically significant with an 89% confidence level. The economic impact is much lower than in Table 2 . For instance, for the median of inflation expectations we obtain a coefficient of 0.082, indicating that an increment of $1 billion in purchases predicts a rise of 8.2 basis points in inflation expectations two years ahead. It is interesting to remark that this impact is the highest in the case of the fourth decile. In this case, an increment of $1 billion in purchases predicts a rise of 9.5 basis points in inflation expectations two years ahead. In Table 4 below, we summarize the results shown in Tables 1-3 but now considering joint tests rather than single tests for each expectation decile. In the first two columns, we show results when we test the null hypothesis that all nine ℎ coefficientes are zero. In the last two columns, we focus on a null hypothesis in which only the five central parameters are jointly equal to zero. These are the parameters associated with the third, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh deciles. It is interesting to note that: the joint tests cannot reject the null when considering expectations one month and one year ahead; and the null is strongly rejected, however, when considering the distribution of inflation expectations two years ahead.
7 Table 4 : Testing the joint hypothesis of no intervention impact on the distribution of inflation expectations Notes: In the first two columns we test the null hypothesis that all nine ℎ coefficients are zero.
In the last two columns we test the null hypothesis that only the central coefficients ℎ are zero. In other words:
Tables 1-4 display the results when estimating (1) without making a distinction between the two intervention programs carried out in our sample period. Consequently, results in Tables 1-4 may be considered as the average impact of the two intervention programs. We may as well try to explore the impact of each of the programs. To that end, we decompose the intervention variable in two components, the first and second intervention, so we now consider the following model
which is exactly the same as (1) with the only difference that now we have two intervention variables: 7 Differences between single and joint tests are typically due to the correlation structure of the t-statistics. When testing a set of single hypothesis using t-statistics, their correlation structure is overlooked creating some discrepancies with a joint test that takes into account this correlation structure. In Table 8 we summarize the results shown in Tables 5-7 but now considering joint tests rather than single tests for each expectation decile. In the last two columns we test the null hypothesis that only the central coefficients ℎ
(1) are zero. In other
Tables 5-8 provide much stronger results that those shown in Tables 1-4. In particular, Table 8 shows that the 2008 intervention had a significant impact on the center of the distribution of inflation expectations at every single horizon under consideration. The economic significance is also stronger when analyzing the 2008 intervention only. For instance, an increment of $1 billion in purchases predicts a raise of 48.6 basis points in inflation expectations one year ahead, which is much higher than the 31.3 basis points shown for the same decile in Table 2 . Similarly, the maximum impact reported in Table 3 is less than 10 basis points whereas the maximum impact reported in Table 7 is 35 basis points for expectations 2 years ahead.
In sharp contrast with the remarkable results reported in Tables 5-8, Tables 9-12 show figures indicating that the intervention carried out in 2011 had little effect on the distribution of inflation expectations. In fact, the only statistically significant figure reported in these tables corresponds to the impact of the interventions on the ninth decile of the distribution of inflation expectations one year ahead. For the rest of the deciles and expectations horizons, no statistically significant impact is detected whatsoever. The joint tests reported in Table 12 
12 i γ ) In the last two columns we test the null hypothesis that only the central coefficients ℎ (2) are zero. In other
Results in Tables Tables 1-4 are probably significant mainly as a consequence of the intervention carried out in 2008. This distinction is important as the macroeconomic conditions surrounding both interventions were very different. It is possible that the high levels of inflation preceding the 2008 intervention may have created an inappropriate environment for an intervention to take place without collateral effects. This is just a hypothesis. The precise reasons behind the different results associated to the two similar intervention programs are ultimately unknown, and are left as a subject for further research. 8 Thus far we have investigated whether the interventions carried out in 2008 and 2011 in Chile had an impact on the distribution of inflation expectations or not. In the next section, we further explore the nature on these impacts. In particular we place our attention on the duration of the impact via an impulse-response analysis.
Impulse-response analysis
Our previous analysis offers an answer to the question about the predictive power of the interventions on the distribution of inflation expectations. With Tables 1-12 , we have shown that interventions did have the ability to predict some changes in the distribution of inflation expectations in 2008. We now focus on the dynamic response of the distribution of inflation expectations to an intervention shock. In particular we would like to know something about the persistence of this response. To that end, we estimate a reduced VAR using several endogenous and exogenous variables. Table 13 shows the variables that we use in our VAR specification: 8 Gnabo, Mello and Moccero (2010) study the interdependencies between monetary policy and forex interventions in inflation targeting economies. This type of linkage might help to explain the heterogeneous results shown in this paper for the two intervention programs under consideration. We estimate a VAR(1) with the variables in first differences just as we did with the previous exercise (SUR). We consider only a first-order VAR due to our small sample size. First we run a total of 27 VARs, one for each inflation expectation decile and horizon. Then we split the intervention variable t M into its two components Figures  6-8 as the impact on inflation expectations is relatively short-lived. Actually, after six months the response is not statistically significant at the 10% significance level. 
Daily analysis
So far we have worked with monthly data and we have characterized the intervention programs in Chile with the monthly amount of dollar purchases. This is a reasonable approach to follow but it has some shortcomings. One of them is that it is difficult to break down the impact of the intervention impact into its announcement component and the impact of the subsequent direct dollar purchases. This is so because the three announcements released during our sample period occurred during months in which purchases were also carried out. For a proper identification of the announcement and direct purchases effect, we think it is much better to work with daily data which will allow us to capture the timing of the interventions programs more adequately.
In the case of the last two intervention programs in Chile, we are able to identify three relevant announcements: Figures 15-17 show the level of intraday spot exchange rate around the intervention announcement. They suggest that the announcement itself caused an important shift in the level of the exchange rate. 11 In these figures, we use different colours to identify three different periods: previous to the announcement (blue), after the announcement but previous to the beginning of the forex operations (red) and the period of market operations (green). 9 The exact time of the announcement is unknown. 10 The exact time of this announcement is also unknown. 11 These short-term prices are calculated according to the representative price of the currency following the methodology in Dominguez (1999) . Most of the short-term prices correspond to five-minute prices. This means that they are representative prices of the transactions that occurred in a five minute window. Nevertheless, we also consider in our analysis longer period windows when no transactions are recorded during a five-minute window. We also include in our data the open and close price. In summary, our data are heterogenous, but they share the common feature of being either five-minute prices or the representative exchange rate during the shortest available window when no transactions are recorded during a five-minute window. We notice that is a variable of zeroes except for the days of the announcements. Therefore takes the value of 8 on April 10, 2008, the value of -2.25 on September 29, 2008 and the value of 12 on January 3, 2011. These numbers correspond to the total size of the intervention programs announced. In the case of the negative number, it corresponds to the sudden interruption of the 2008 intervention program. Let us recall that the 2008 program was supposed to buy US$8,000 million. It only purchased US$5,750 million, so we assume that the market was surprised by the interruption of the program in terms of the US$ 2,250 millions that were not fulfilled. Table 14 shows the results of the maximum likelihood estimation of (6). This table indicates that the direct purchases of dollars carried out in 2008 had a statistically significant effect on daily exchange rate returns. The similar dollar purchases carried out during the 2011 intervention are not statistically significant, however. Nevertheless, our announcement variable is statistically significant, suggesting that the intervention announcements shifted upwards exchange rate returns, which is consistent with the evidence depicted in Figures 15-17 .
We now focus on the estimation of the effect of exchange market interventions on a measure of break-even inflation rate. We consider a measure that should be interpreted as an expectation of the inflation that will be accumulated over one year, starting 12 months from the current period. We use this variable as a proxy of the two-years ahead inflation expectations. We consider the following specification: Table 15 for six different variations of the main specification (7). From Table 15 , we see that in all our specifications the announcement variable is statistically significant at high confidence levels. The sign of the estimated coefficient is also easy to interpret, as the announcement of a dollar purchase program may generate a rise in inflation expectations. These results suggest that an intervention announcement for $10 billion tends to raise inflation expectations between 24 and 59 basis points on the day after the announcement takes place.
Direct dollar purchases in 2008 are sometimes statistically significant with a positive sign, whereas the variable capturing direct dollar purchases in 2011 is not statistically significant at usual levels.
This analysis suggests that forex interventions in Chile had an impact on the break-even inflation rate, especially at the moment of the announcement of the intervention programs. To the extent that break-even inflation rate may be consider a good proxy of inflation expectations, the results in Table 15 corroborate those reported in previous sections when working with survey-based measures of inflation expectations.
Conclusions
Sterilised exchange rate interventions are controversial for a number of reasons. Part of this controversy is related to the huge amount of resources that are typically involved. They are also controversial because it is not entirely clear if they are successful in fulfilling the implicit or explicit goal they are designed to satisfy, and the empirical evidence provides mixed results in this respect. In the case of inflation targeting countries, there is an additional source of controversy: irrespective of their effectiveness, interventions may have the collateral effect of an undesired impact on the distribution of inflation expectations. This may happen because it may be not entirely clear whether monetary policy actions are focused on the inflation target or on any other implicit target related to the exchange rate.
As in many small open economies with an inflation target, Chile's monetary authorities have decided to intervene the exchange rate market in several occasions. Using data from the last two intervention periods in Chile, we have focused our attention on the linkage between the amount of exchange rate interventions and the distribution of inflation expectations in Chile. Using a multiple equation method, we have found that the amount of the intervention Granger-causes several deciles of the distribution of inflation expectations at longer horizons.
Notwithstanding the above, our results suggest that the interventions in 2008 and 2011 had different implications for the distribution of inflation expectations. Whereas the impact during the intervention program in 2008 was both economically and statistically significant, the impact during the 2011 program was almost negligible. This distinction is important as the macroeconomic conditions surrounding both interventions were very different. It is possible that the high levels of inflation preceding the 2008 intervention may have created an inappropriate environment for an intervention to take place without collateral damage. This is just a hypothesis. The precise reasons behind the different results associated to the two similar intervention programs are ultimately unknown, and are left as a subject for further research.
A daily exercise using the break-even inflation rate as a proxy for inflation expectations is roughly consistent with the analysis based on monthly data. Our results also suggest that the interventions did have an impact on daily exchange returns, especially in the days after the programs were announced.
These results seem to show that the side effects of exchange rate interventions over the distribution of inflation expectations may naturally depend on the economic environment in which they are implemented. Well aware of the possible conflict between an inflationary target and forex interventions, Chile's monetary authorities have explicitly left room for occasional interventions in exceptional circumstances of excessive depreciation or appreciation of the local currency. According to our results the last intervention episode in Chile posed no serious threat to the inflation target. Nevertheless, they also suggest that the intervention program carried out in the year 2008 may have shifted upward the distribution of inflation expectations two years ahead.
